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NOTES
THE VALIDITY OF CRIMINAL PRESUMPTIONS IN LOUISIANA
Although the prosecution has a very heavy burden in criminal
cases--establishing proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt'-the use of
presumptions 2 often makes that burden easier to discharge. A 1970 United
States Supreme Court decision, though not dealing with presumptions,
cast serious doubt on their constitutionality. In re Winship3 expressly held
that the due process clause of the fifth amendment requires all elements of
a crime to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.4 Applying the Winship
standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Searle,5 in 1976, found
a judicially created presumption-that one in the unexplained possession
of recently burglarized goods is guilty of burglary6 -to be unconstitution-
al. Distinguishing Searle on quite narrow grounds,7 however, the same
court in a 1977 decision, State v. Jamerson 8 affirmed a burglary convic-
1. According to the United States Supreme Court, "[wihere one party has at
stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this
margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the
burden . . . of persuading the fact finder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958);
accord, e.g., Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895); City of Monroe v. High, 254 La. 362, 223 So. 2d 834
(1969); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 341 at 798-802 (Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK]; 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 at 316-25 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as 9 WIGMORE].
2. A presumption is a legal device allowing the trier of fact to assume the
existence of a fact when proof of other facts is shown. By enabling prosecutors to
establish elements of a crime, presumptions are a "very potent means of convic-
tion." Chamberlain, Presumptions as First-Aid to the District Attorney, 14
A.B.A.J. 287, 288 (1928). Some of the classic works on presumptions and their
nature and effects are J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EvI-
DENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 313-52 (1898) [hereinafter cited as THAYER]; 9 WIG-
MORE, supra note 1, §§ 2490-93 at 286-93; Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5
TUL. L. REV. 17, 178 (1930) (parts I & II).
3. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
4. Prior to Winship, the Court had never explicitly ruled on the due process
requirement relative to the prosecutor's burden of proof in criminal cases because
the reasonable doubt standard was recognized in all jurisdictions. W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 8 at 44-46 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
LAFAVE & SCOTT].
5. 339 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1976). The Searle court found constitutional underpin-
nings for the principle enunciated in Winship in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
Article I, Sections 2, 13, 16, 17. Id. at 1202.
6. See the text at notes 47-50, infra.
7. See the text at note 68, infra.
8. 341 So. 2d 1118 (La. 1977).
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tion with language9 suggesting that it might uphold in similar circum-
stances the application of the legislative presumption that one in the
unexplained possession of recently stolen goods is the thief.10 This note
will discuss these and other developments regarding criminal presump-
tions and will assess the current validity of such presumptions in
Louisiana.
Unfortunately, much confusion exists regarding the effect and appli-
cation of presumptions, largely due to inconsistent use and consistent
misuse of terminology."1 They are generally classified as either presump-
tions of law or of fact, 12 the former including both conclusive and rebut-
table 13 presumptions, and the latter encompassing those which are merely
permissive. A conclusive presumption, such as the exemption of children
under ten years of age from criminal responsibility, 14 allows no contrary
evidence by the opponent. 15 It is actually a substantive rule of law
9. In response to defendant's assignment of error, Justice Summers, writing
for the Jamerson court, noted at the outset that no contemporaneous objection was
made to the jury instruction utilizing the statutory theft presumption as required by
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841. As a result, it is arguable that the court's distinction of
the Searle holding is dictum.
10. LA. R.S. 15:432 (1950) provides in part: "A legal presumption relieves him
in whose favor it exists from the necessity of any proof; but may none the less be
destroyed by rebutting evidence; such is the presumption. . . that the person in the
unexplained possession of property recently stolen is the thief .... "
11. E.g., Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MicH.
L. REV. 195, 196-207 (1953), wherein the author lists and discusses eight senses in
which the term had been used by the courts. Professor Edmund Morgan, one of the
most noted writers in the field, has stated that "every writer of sufficient intelli-
gence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic
of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of
despair."
12. JONES ON EVIDENCE § 3:3 at 130 (6th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as JONES];
Stumbo, Presumptions-A View at Chaos, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 182, 192-94 (1964); 9
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2491 at 288.
13. The rebuttable presumption, otherwise known as the mandatory presump-
tion, has the effect of forcing the jury to find the presumed fact if the proved fact is
believed and no evidence to the contrary is produced by the opponent. But because
use of a mandatory presumption would infringe the defendant's right to be free
from a directed verdict for the prosecution, elements of a crime may only be
presumed permissively. Since these presumptions are treated as mere permissive
presumptions, the jury is allowed to find the presumed fact, but is not required to
make such a finding even in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Note, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 341, 343 (1970).
14. LA. R.S. 14:13 (1950).
15. LA. R.S. 15:433 (1950) ("A conclusive presumption is one against which no
proof can be admitted, such as the presumption that attaches to res judicata
.. .
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improperly referred to as a presumption. 16 The rebuttable presumption,
considered the only true one, has the practical effect of shifting to the
defendant the burden of producing evidence during the trial. 7 An example
of a rebuttable presumption, the type most often found in criminal statutes,
is that, in a prosecution of negligent homicide, the violation of a statute or
ordinance is considered "only as presumptive evidence" ' 18 of criminal
negligence. The term "presumption of fact," though often used inter-
changeably with that of "permissive presumption," 19 more properly con-
notes an "inference," a term which itself is often confused with "pre-
sumption. "20 An inference is merely a conclusion drawn by the trier of
fact from the evidence through use of the reasoning process. 21
Presumptions are commonly attacked on the grounds that their use
violates the criminal defendant's rights to a jury trial22 and his right not to
16. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2492 at 292; Brosman, supra note 2, at 24.
17. E.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n.11 (1973) (practical
effect of instructing jury on inference is to shift the burden of going forward with
evidence to defendant); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 45 (1969) (before
burden of production is shifted to defendant, prosecution must show inference is
permissible); THAYER, supra note 2, at 314 (prima facie presumptions cast upon the
party against whom they operate the duty of going forward, in argument or evi-
dence, on the particular point to which they relate); 9 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §
2491 at 288 (presumption is rule of law attaching to one evidentiary fact certain
procedural consequences as to the duty of production of other evidence by the
opponent).
18. LA. R.S. 14:32 (1950).
19. JONES, supra note 12, § 3:3 at 131: "Since these inferences, sometimes
called presumptions of fact, are mere permissible deductions from evidence, it is
apparent that they are in fact not presumptions at all. However, they are constantly
so called in the decisions although often in a confused and inaccurate manner."
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 342 at 804, n.31 and accompanying text. See cases
cited in 29 AM. JUR. 2d § 161 (1967).
20. 1 WHARTON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 139 at 234-35 (13th ed. 1972) (If defend-
ant is in possession of recently stolen property, an inference, sometimes called a
presumption, arises that he has stolen the property.); 9 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §
2491 at 288 ("The employment here of the term 'presumption' is due simply to
historical usage, by which 'presumption' was originally a term equivalent, in one
sense, to 'inference' . . . . There is in truth but one kind of presumption; and the
term 'presumption of fact' should be discarded as useless and confusing.").
21. JONES, supra note 12, § 3:3 at 131: "It is evident that many of the instances
commonly cited as examples of presumptions of fact are mere illustrations of
circumstantial, evidence. They are inferences drawn by the ordinary reasoning
powers and without the aid of any artificial rules of law, inferences which, however
well founded in some circumstances, are entirely unjustifiable under others."
22. This objection is based on the contention that, by specifying the probative
force to be given a proven fact, the legislature infringes on the factfinding function
of the jury. E.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 852 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 431 (1970) (Douglas & Black,
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be compelled to be a witness against himself,23 including his right to be
free from unfavorable commentary by the court on his election not to
testify in rebuttal of the presumption. 24 The adverse effect of presumptions
on criminal defendants has caused the United States Supreme Court to
review them in light of the due lprocess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the United States. 25 In a 1910 civil
case, Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed,26 the Supreme Court stated
that in order to satisfy due process there must be "some rational connec-
tion between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the
inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as
to be a purely arbitrary mandate.'"27
In the 1925 case of Yee Hem v. United States,28 the Supreme Court
applied the "rational connection" test to a criminal statute providing that
possession of illegally imported opium is sufficient to authorize conviction
of the crime of possessing such with knowledge of its imported nature.
The Court found the connection between possession and knowledge to be
rational, thus comporting with due process. 29 Subsequent decisions of the
Court formulated two other standards to assess the validity of criminal
presumptions, the "greater includes the lesser "30 test and the "compara-
tive convenience' test. But in 1943, in Tot v. United States,32 the Court
JJ., dissenting); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 77 (1965) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); Comment, Criminal Statutory Presumptions and the Reasonable Doubt Stand-
ard of Proof: Is Due Process Overdue?, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 223, 238 (1974).
23. E.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 847 (1973) (rejected); Turner v.
United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417-18 (1970) (rejected); Yee Hem v. United States,
268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925) (rejected); State v. Curry, 319 So. 2d 917 (La. 1975)
(rejected); State v. McQueen, 278 So. 2d 114 (La. 1973) (rejected).
24. E.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n.12 (1973) (rejected);
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70-71 (1965) (rejected); State v. Womack, 283
So. 2d 708 (La. 1973) (rejected); contra, French v. State, 256 Ark. 298, 506 S.W. 2d
820 (1974) (trial court's instruction to jury, a verbatim recitation of the statutory
presumption, amounted to a prohibited comment on the evidence) noted in 29 ARK.
L. REV. 247 (1975).
25. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 344 at 811.
26. 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
27. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
28. 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
29. Id. at 183-185.
30. The "greater includes the lesser" power test was first proposed in Ferry v.
Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928). The test maintains that the power of the legislature to
prescribe the elements of an offense means that it could have done so without
including the presumed element.
31. The test of "comparative convenience" was formulated in Morrison v.
California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934). This test asks whether it is easier for the defendant
to disprove the presumed element than for the prosecution to prove it.
32. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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expressly rejected the first 33 and reduced the latter to the status of a
corollary, 34 leaving the "rational connection" test as the controlling
standard of the constitutionality of criminal presumptions.
35
In the 1969 decision of Leary v. United States, 36 the Court modified
the "rational connection" standard, elevating the threshold that criminal
presumptions must reach in order to satisfy due process requirements. The
presumption at issue provided that possession of marijuana was sufficient
to authorize conviction of the crime of transporting the prohibited sub-
stance with knowledge of its illegal importation. 37 The Court held that a
''presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary' and hence
unconstitutional, unless it can be said with substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend."-38 After an extensive examination of the
33. The "greater includes the lesser" test was rejected by the Tot Court
because even though the legislature could have created the crime without the
presumed element, it had not chosen to do so "for whatever reason." Id. at 472.
34. The "compartive convenience" test was recognized only as a "corollary"
to the "rational connection" standard by the Tot Court because of its impermissi-
ble effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Id. at 469. See the
discussion in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 32-33, & nn.56-61 (1969). A statute
may not shift the burden of ultimate persuasion of an essential element of the crime
charged to the defendant in a criminal case. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975).
35. Two later decisions considering the question of the constitutionality of the
presumptions at issue served to demonstrate the application of the "rational con-
nection" test. In United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), a case involving a
prosecution for carrying on the business of an unbonded distiller, the government
was aided by a presumption making presence at the site of an illegal still sufficient
evidence to convict. The Court found that since few people unconnected with the
bootlegging would be found at the hidden still, there was a sufficient rational
connection between presence and "carrying on" the illegal activity to uphold the
presumption. Id. at 67-68. But in United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), the
Court considered a similar presumption dealing with the crime of possession of an
illegal still and decided that, absent some showing of defendant's function, the
inference of possession from presence at. the still was too tenuous and arbitrary to
merit upholding the presumption. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 344 at
813-14.
36. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
37. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 70 Stat. 570, 21 U.S.C. § 176a
(1964), repealed by 84 Stat. 1291, 1292 (1970).
38. 395 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added). The words "substantial assurance" prob-
ably reflect the fact that the Court examined at length the legislative record leading
to the presumption, thereby adding a degree of scrutiny which the "rational connec-
tion" standard lacked. Note, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 897, 904 n.33 (1973). It is signifi-
cant that, in a footnote, the Court stated that because of its finding that the
presumption was unconstitutional under the "more likely than not" standard, it
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legislative record leading to the statute, the Court found the presumption
constitutionally infirm because of the speculative nature of assuming that
possessors knew the source of their marijuana.3 9
The Leary Court, in its apparent adoption of a "more likely that not"
standard, failed to recognize an important difference between the standard
of proof required in civil and criminal litigation: a plaintiff in civil
litigation need prove his case only by a preponderance of evidence (more
likely than not), while a criminal prosecutor must prove his case beyond a
reasonable doubt.40 A year later in a landmark decision, In re Winship,4 1
the Supreme Court expressly held that due process "protects the accused
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. ,42 Although the facts of the
case did not involve presumptions,4 3 the holding of Winship raises doubts
regarding the propriety of using presumptions which satisfy only a "more
likely than not" standard. 44 Stated differently, a presumed element of a
crime should have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as should any
other element of a crime, rather than by a mere preponderance of the
evidence .
Until recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court failed to apply constitu-
tional scrutiny to the use of criminal presumptions; rather, the court
would "not reach the question whether a criminal presumption which passes muster
when so judged must also satisfy the criminal 'reasonable doubt' standard if proof
of the crime charged or an essential element thereof depends upon its use." 395
U.S. at 36 n.64.
39. 395 U.S. at 52, 53.
40. McCORMICK, supra note 1, §§ 339, 341 at 793, 798; 9 WIGMORE, supra note
i, §§ 2497-98 at 316-25. See Note, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341 (1970), for a very cogent
and forceful argument against using a civil litigation standard of proof in criminal
trials.
41. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
42. Id. at 364. The Court quoted Professor McCormick: "The 'demand for a
higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from
ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula beyond a reasonable
doubt seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law
jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince
the trier of all the essential elements of guilt."' Id. at 361.
43. Winship concerned a juvenile proceeding in New York Family Court in
which a twelve-year old boy was found guilty of theft. The judge, pursuant to
statute, based his determination on a preponderance of evidence and placed the
juvenile in a training school for no less than six years.
44. Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and
the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HARV. Civ. RTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 390, 421
(1976).
45. Accord, MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 346 at 832.
assumed their validity by relying on precedent.4 6 An example of this
attitude is found in the court's treatment of the presumption contained in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:432 that "the person in the unexplained
possession of property recently stolen is the thief. . . ., In 1949, State
v. Shelby48 extended the presumption to include the offense of burglary
and was relied on consistently for the questionable 49 proposition that the
state need only prove the possession of the property in order to secure a
conviction of burglary unless the defendant explains his possession to the
satisfaction of the jury.50 In 1973, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v.
McQueen51 rejected a constitutional challenge to the presumption based
on infringement of the defendant's presumption of innocence and his right
against self-incrimination. The court applied the Leary formulation and
concluded that 'more likely than not' a person in the unexplained
possession of stolen property is the thief, ' 52 ignoring the fact that the
defendant was charged with burglary, a crime composed of completely
different elements.
In the 1976 decision of State v. Searle,53 the Louisiana Supreme
Court considered the application of the same presumption to another case
in which the record was devoid of evidence linking the defendant to the
burglary. 4 In Searle, however, the court chose to apply the stricter
''reasonable doubt" standard to judge the validity of the presumption. The
court referred to various possible methods of acquiring the property other
than guilty participation in the act proscribed by the burglary statute and
emphasized that the presumption improperly relieved the prosecution of
proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although
the Searle holding is limited to finding the presumption of burglary invalid
for failing to meet the "reasonable doubt" standard,55 the court implied
that other judicial extensions of the section 432 presumption were uncon-
stitutional56 and suggested that the legislature re-examine all criminal
46. E.g., State v. White, 247 La. 19, 169 So. 2d 894 (1964).
47. See note 10, supra.
48. 215 La. 637, 41 So. 2d 458 (1949).
49. State v. Searle, 339 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1976) (original hearing) (Tate, J.,
dissenting); State v. Curry, 319 So. 2d 917 (La. 1975) (Barham, J., dissenting).
50. But see State v. Searle, 339 So. 2d 1194, 1202 (La. 1976) (rehearing,
overruling State v. Shelby).
51. 278 So. 2d 114 (La. 1973).
52. Id. at 120.
53. 339 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1976).
54. Id. at 1201.
55. Id. at 1206.
56. In State v. Kaufman, 278 So. 2d 86 (La. 1973), the Louisiana Supreme
Court expressly refused to extend the section 432 theft presumption to include a
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presumptions in light of newly emphasized constitutional rights. 57
The majority in Searle relied on two United States Supreme Court
decisions subsequent to Leary, Turner v. United States58 and Barnes v.
United States,9 in its decision to apply the reasonable doubt standard to
criminal presumptions. In Turner, the Court considered a statute prohibit-
ing the possession of heroin and cocaine with knowledge of its imported
nature. 60 The statute further provided that knowledge of illegal importa-
tion could be presumed from the fact of possession. The Court, employing
the Leary method of analysis, investigated the legislative record and
found strong evidence that at least ninety-eight percent of all heroin in the
United States is imported, while less than fifty percent of the illegal
cocaine is imported. The Court concluded that the presumption of guilty
knowledge of illegal importation from possession of heroin satisfied both
the more stringent "reasonable doubt" standard and the "more likely than
not" standard, 6 but invalidated the same presumption relative to cocaine
for failing to meet even the "more likely than not" standard. 62 In Barnes,
the Court followed a similar rationale in upholding a trial court's instruc-
tion using an inference that one in possession of recently stolen treasury
checks had knowledge that the property was stolen.
presumption that the unexplained possessor of property stolen during a homicide is
guilty of the homicide. State v. Braxton, 257 La. 183, 241 So. 2d 763 (1970),
extended the presumption to include the crime of armed robbery and is overruled
by the Searle decision. But see State v. Montoya, 340 So. 2d 557 (La. 1976) (court
allowed the use of the section 432 theft presumption in an armed robbery prosecu-
tion, but remanded for a new trial because the trial court's instruction and the
district attorney's argument improperly referred to defendant's post-arrest silence
in an attempt to prove that the possession was "unexplained").
57. The court asked: "[I]s it as rational to presume in 1976 that a person in the
recent and unexplained possession of stolen goods is the thief as it was in 1928 when
La. R.S. 15:432 was enacted? Since then society has changed and constitutional
rights have evolved, particularly the right to remain silent under police questioning
as well as in court. The constitutionality of a presumption should be judged at the
time it is applied and not as of the time it was enacted." 339 So. 2d 1194, 1203 (La.
1976).
58. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
59. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1909), repealed by 84 Stat. 1291 (1970).
61. 396 U.S. at 416: "Whether judged by the more-likely-than-not standard
applied in Leary v. U.S. . . . or by the more exacting reasonable-doubt standard
normally applicable in criminal cases, § 174 is valid insofar as it permits a jury to
infer that heroin possessed in this country is a smuggled drug." Once the absence of
domestic heroin is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's knowledge
becomes a natural inference from the facts. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 344 at 816.
62. 396 U.S. at 418-20.
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Although the United States Supreme Court did not expressly establish
the "reasonable doubt" standard as the controlling determinant of the
constitutionality of criminal presumptions, many lower courts and legal
commentators feel the decisions implied as much.63 The Searle court,
following this line of authority, stated in dictum that it is incumbent upon
the prosecution to demonstrate before using a presumption that the pre-
sumed fact follows beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven fact on
which it is made to depend.64 While the theoretical justification for such a
requirement is easily discernible, 65 the burden placed upon the prosecution
may be so cumbersome as to render application of the requirement unlike-
ly. Without the aid of empirical data justifying the presumption, a state
prosecutor would be unable to convince a court in any given case that the
presumed fact follows beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven fact.
In the 1977 case of State v. Jamerson,66 a prosecution for aggravated
burglary, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not resolve the problem of
whether the prosecution should be required to fulfill a preliminary burden
of proof before using a presumption. In Jamerson, the court sustained a
trial court's instruction using Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:432 and
rejected the defendant's claim that Searle prohibited such an instruction.
The Jamerson court, in language which was arguably dictum,67 reasoned
that though Searle forbade a jury instruction that one in the unexplained
possession of recently burglarized property is presumed to be the burglar,
"the case did not hold that . . . [the possessor] . . . could not be
presumed to be the thief. .. . Because the defendant's argument was
not directed to the issue, the court did not discuss whether the section 432
presumption of theft satisfied the Searle reasonable doubt standard.69
63. E.g., United States v. Carter, 522 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States
v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Johnson, 433 F.2d 1160
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Dinkins v. State, 29 Md. App. 577, 349 A.2d 676 (1976); State v.
Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E. 2d 558 (1975); Christie & Pye, Presumptions and
Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919, 923 n.24
(1970); Cf. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 344 at 816 ("[t]he Court's frequent
reference to that standard in Turner, coupled with its decision in In re Winship
recognizing that such a measure of proof is constitutionally required in criminal
cases, makes it likely that the reasonable doubt standard will be applied to test the
validity of presumptions in the future.").
64. 339 So. 2d at 1205.
65. The reasonable doubt standard as applied to presumptions would require
the jury to treat the presumed fact in the same manner as all other facts to be
proved. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 346 at 832.
66. 341 So. 2d 1118 (La. 1977).
67. See note 9, supra.
68. 341 So. 2d at 1120 (emphasis by the court).
69. Similarly, in State v. Montoya, 340 So. 2d 557 (La. 1976), the court did not
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The reasoning employed by the Jamerson court is objectionable on
several grounds. Theft is the taking of anything of value without the
consent of the owner. 70 The crime of burglary does not consist of taking of
property; rather, it is the unauthorized entering of a structure with intent to
commit a felony or theft. 7' Allowing use of the statutory theft presumption
in a burglary prosecution effectively nullifies the logical result reached by
the Searle court. By using the theft presumption, the prosecution is still
relieved of the burden of proving the elements of the crime of burglary
beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the Jamerson court did not require
the prosecution to demonstrate that the presumption of complicity in
burglary follows beyond a reasonable doubt from proof of possession of
the recently stolen goods. As earlier stated, such a requirement would
seem to follow logically from the powerful language used in the Searle
72opinion.
While the result reached by the court in Searle is meritorious, it is
submitted that the analysis of the issues involved is faulty. In deciding to
apply the reasonable doubt standard to a state presumption, the Searle
court relied primarily upon the United States Supreme Court decisions
construing and applying federal statutes. The court, however, failed to
recognize a substantial difference between state and federal legislation
which proscribes criminal conduct. Congress derives its jurisdiction from
the Constitution. The commerce clause,73 for example, provides Congress
with the authority to regulate the importation of drugs. In order to ensure
federal participation in punishing the basic fact of possessing heroin, and
at the same time comply with constitutional restrictions, the importation
element must be included in the definition of the offense. To facilitate the
prosecutor's burden of proof, the law presumes that the heroin was
imported, a presumption adequately supported by statistical data compiled
during congressional hearings on the matter. 74 The state legislature, on the
other hand, need not include, for jurisdictional purposes, presumed ele-
ments in defining a crime. Even though it chose to do so, the state
feel "compelled to decide ... whether the (section 432) presumption is unconstitu-
tional on its face under the test . . . announced in State v. Searle," because other
facts in the trial constituted error sufficient to warrant a new trial. Id. at 561.
70. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 653, § 1.
71. Id. § 60 (1950); id. § 62 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 649, § i.
72. See the text at note 64, supra.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
74. Of course, the courts must decide whether the presumption satisfies the
appropriate standard of proof and comports with due process, as demonstrated by
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), and Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398
(1970). See the text at notes 38, 39, 61, & 62, supra.
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legislature would not have the ability to conduct the extensive hearings and
investigation needed to substantiate the presumption. The state legislature
simply does not have similar resources available to compile the requisite
empirical evidence on the subject.
It should be apparent that many state legislative presumptions are not
actually presumptions in the proper sense primarily because of an absence
of supporting evidence. This is especially true of Louisiana's statutory
"legal presumption" of theft from proof of unexplained possession of
stolen goods. The Louisiana Supreme Court has described this concept as
a presumption of fact 75 which is tantamount to stating that there exists no
presumption at all.76 As aforementioned," a presumption of fact is not
actually a presumption; rather, it is a logical inference drawn from the
circumstances of the evidence presented without the aid of any artificial
rules of law.
The above distinction between an inference and a true presumption is
important in light of the effect the label "presumption" has upon a jury, 78
which is sworn to accept the law as provided by the court. 79 The term
carries a technical, artificial weight, suggesting that the jury, although
ultimate trier of fact, is obligated to find the existence of the presumed fact
if it believes the proven fact.8° True presumptions of law serve an impor-
tant function in the administration of criminal justice and should not be
dispensed with, provided they are amply supported by empirical evidence.
Possession of recently stolen property, however, is actually no more than
75. State v. Searle, 339 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1976) (original hearing); State v. Pace,
183 La. 838, 165 So. 6 (1935).
76. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2491 at 288.
77. See the text and accompanying notes at notes 19-21, supra.
78. Judge Learned Hand once stated: "In discussions among lawyers and
judges of the difference between a permissible inference and a presumption, the
terminology may be unimportant. But the jury may be misled by the word 'pre-
sumption'; and here it may have interpreted that word as far stronger than a
permissible inference." United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. den. sub. nom. Grimaldi v. United States, 337 U.S. 931 (1949); accord, United
States v. Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1960); Barfield v. United States, 229
F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1956).
79. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 802.
80. LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 4, § 21 at 147-48 (presumption that permits
jury to find guilt from proof of basic fact tends to encourage jury to draw conclu-
sions it might otherwise not draw); Comment, Criminal Statutory Presumptions and
the Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof: Is Due Process Overdue?, 19 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 223, 231-33 (1974) (presumptions have undue influence on jurors in creating
a tendency to favor presumed fact and ignore prosecutor's burden of proving it
beyond a reasonable doubt); Note, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341, 351-52 (1970) (jury will
exercise the authority given it by statute to find the presumed fact).
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circumstantial evidence that the posssessor is the culprit. 81 The fact of
possession is of course relevant and admissible evidence during the trial,
but the jury alone should have the power to determine what weight the fact
should be given in view of the entire evidence presented. There is no
legislative empirical evidence which supports the so-called legal presump-
tion contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 432. The legislature
should amend section 432 to describe the possessory concept correctly as
an inference, rather than a legal presumption. Under such an amendment,
the prosecutor would not be required to satisfy the "reasonable doubt"
standard relative to presumed elements, and would still be able to bring the
inference to the attention of the jury, without the benefit of misapplied
terminology to the prejudice of the defendant.
Timothy Jonathan Bradley
CHARACTER AND PRIOR CONDUCT OF THE VICTIM IN SUPPORT
OF A PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE
Charged with murder, the defendant claimed that he shot the de-
ceased in self-defense. Although the defendant introduced evidence indi-
cating that the deceased had attacked him with a knife, the trial court
excluded testimony of prior acts of violence committed by the deceased
against others. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and held that, in a
homicide case, when there is "appreciable evidence" of an overt act or
hostile demonstration on the part of the victim, prior acts of violence by
the victim against others, of which the defendant had knowledge, are
admissible as tending to show the defendant's state of mind. State v. Lee,
331 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976).
When the defendant in a homicide case claims he acted in self-
defense, evidence of the character and background of the victim may be
relevant to two distinct issues: (1) who was the aggressor in the encounter,
and (2) whether the defendant's apprehension of serious bodily harm was
reasonable. Admission of this evidence, however, creates a danger that the
81. E.g., People v. Grimes, 113 Cal. App. 2d 365, 248 P.2d 130 (1952) (unex-
plained possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance tending to show
guilt when coupled with other suspicious circumstances); Drew v. State, 61 Okla.
Crim. 48, 65 P.2d 549 (1937); see Comment, Presumptions and Burdens ofProof, 21
Loy. L. REV. 377, 399-400 (1975).
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